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2017 celebrates fifty years since the publication of Jacques Derrida’s celebrated original trio of 
books De la grammatologie, La voix et le phénomène, and L’écriture et la différance. This 
anniversary is being marked with various events reflecting on the influence and significance of 
Derrida’s work. Just prior to this anniversary comes a timely publication from Rodolphe Gasché, 
a towering figure amidst esteemed scholars of Derrida’s work. Gasché’s work engages with 
aspects of Derrida’s thought which have long been of interest to legal scholars: the force and 
possibility of deconstruction, the relationship between law and justice, judgment, and the 
infamous declaration that “[d]econstruction is justice.” 
 In the opening pages of Deconstruction, Its Force, Its Violence Gasché argues that 
Derrida’s work is founded on a careful re-reading of the often-overlooked complexities which 
formulate presence in Western metaphysics. Based on this re-reading, Derrida understands that 
“being and logos are not without a reference to alterity” (xiv). Thus: “Without the demonstration 
that alterity is coeval with sameness, Derridean thought would not be possible” (xiv). Gasché 
then finesses Derrida’s modus operandi or “strategic operation” into two separate movements 
(2). The first involves a constant elaboration of the often-overlooked element within metaphysics 
whereby “the Other [is] intimately interconnected with the thought of the Same” (xiv). The 
second then develops this point by showing that the Other in question, contra Hegel, “cannot let 
itself be restricted to the Other of the Same” and “is never merely the Other of my-Self” (xv). 
This two-step movement of deconstruction, occurring within the framework of metaphysics, is 
central to Gasché’s book as throughout it he reveals several “fundamentally asymmetric” 
instances of the Other in the works he examines (xv). Via this reading Gasché aims to meet the 
challenge of “seeking to do justice to what the Other demands from thought” (xv).  
 Gasché’s book is divided into three chapters, and an appendix. The three chapters refer, 
respectively, to the “force,” “possibility,” and “violence” of deconstruction. In the first chapter, 
Gasché engages with force as both a specific concept of deconstruction and as a “momentum, an 
élan” of deconstruction (1). Here, Gasché explains how Derrida’s reading of Gottfried Leibniz 
leads him to construct a “differential concept of force” (18). Based on the insight that 
“differentiality as a structural feature of difference presupposes a system of differences,” Gasché 
argues that a differential concept of force that accommodates the Other of the non-same is the 
force of deconstruction: this differential concept of force is “the force of deconstruction 
(genitivus objectivus)” (18).  
 Gasché then moves to what is – perhaps for legal scholars at least – the main chapter of 
the book, in which he addresses deconstructive accounts of juridical issues. This chapter 
examines the ‘possibility’ of deconstruction in the setting of law and justice. However, Gasché’s 
first move is to bring the previously explained account of force into conversation with Derrida’s 
now famous essay “Force of Law,” thus transposing a “force that is what it is only negatively, 
that is, through its differential relation and exposure to other forces,” onto Derrida’s framing of 
the relationship between law and justice (28).  
 Gasché’s analysis then covers several of Derrida’s key points. First, he distinguishes 
Walter Benjamin’s and Derrida’s respective accounts of originary violence in law, whereby the 
former is “an actual violence” and the latter is “a necessary (but not therefore actual) possibility 
without which there would be no such thing as a law or justice as law” (31). Second, Gasché 
turns to Derrida’s account of how law relates to justice and notes that, as is perhaps well known 
by now, for Derrida law is a present phenomenon whereas justice is “something 
nonphenomenalizable, a possibility that is only thinkable” (34). Third, Gasché examines how 
Derrida’s development of the work of Michel de Montaigne and Blaise Pascal provides a 
different account of the “factual force, power, or violence” which is embedded in the law (36). 
Gasché explains that Derrida’s work unveils their “more intrinsic structure” which leads to an 
“ontological, and perhaps, transcendental interconnectedness” between them (36). Finally, 
Gasché explains how Derrida’s account of the “mystical foundation of authority” answers the 
question of how and where deconstruction is possible in the relationship between law and justice. 
He notes that because Derrida views “the law and its authority [as] hav[ing] no other foundation 
than the violent performative act by which they are instituted in silence without a foundation 
exterior to them,” it is this very “unfoundedness of the law … [which] makes the law essentially 
deconstructible” (40). The possibility of deconstruction arises because the law has no guarantee 
other than itself and consequently its continued preservation is open to the asymmetrical affects 
of the Other within the law’s ipseity. Throughout this section Gasché’s explication is 
refreshingly efficient, nuanced, and detailed, with a clarity that is to be commended. 
 Gasché then ends the chapter with an extended discussion of how justice motivates the 
deconstructibility of law. Through a recollection and elaboration of Derrida’s famous statement, 
“[d]econstruction is justice,” Gasché provides an account of the way in which law, justice, and 
deconstruction operate as a tripartite system (43). First, he recalls Derrida’s statement in “Force 
of Law” that “[d]econstruction takes place in the interval that separates the undeconstructibility 
of justice from the deconstructibility of law” (43-44). Gasché interprets this quote to suggest that 
justice impacts law as its “ideal horizon,” despite the fact that the possibility of this ideality is 
impossible and nonphenomenalizable (46). Yet it is precisely the point that this “possible must 
remain possible as possible in its very impossibility”’ (45). This ensures that law is always 
deconstructible in the name of justice: such deconstructibility is the ‘opus operatum’ in the drive 
towards justice, as a ‘work of vigilance,’ ‘without surrendering its virtual status’ (45). Following 
this argument Gasché unveils another asymmetric tension between the universal nature of law 
and the singular instance of justice (48–49). Here he explains how Derrida’s maxim 
“deconstruction is justice” is illustrative of a “double movement” which first contains an 
engagement with the history and legacy of justice and then enacts a limitless and “inevitably 
hyperbolic” responsibility to that received legacy (53, 57). The chapter concludes by highlighting 
that there is a violence in the “force” of deconstruction cutting into law, a legal judgment, or any 
prescribed legal norm. However, this is “a violence that the singular other itself demands in order 
to be recognised and to be addressed in his or her singularity” (58). With this crucial point it is 
again clear that the reading of Derrida’s juridical work offered by Gasché is eloquently framed 
by his prioritisation of deconstruction’s concern for the accommodation of the asymmetrical 
Other.  
 Gasché’s third chapter focuses on the famous discussion of violence featured in Derrida’s 
Of Grammatology, where it is argued that Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques incorrectly 
presents writing as the corruptor of innocent full-speech. Here, once again, Gasché expertly 
illustrates the violence which is inherent in deconstruction both as a movement within and 
against metaphysics, as well as “an inaugurating or enabling violence” without which nothing 
could originate, conceptualise, nor exist (71). This chapter is a fitting reminder of both 
deconstruction’s weighty metaphysical critique and the specific critique it originally enacted, 
fifty years ago on the very first page of Of Grammatology, against the “ethnocentrism which, 
everywhere and always, had controlled the concept of writing.”  
 The final section of Gasché’s book, an appendix titled “Have We Done with the Empire 
of Judgment?,” refers to Derrida’s, as of yet untranslated, text titled “Préjugés: Devant la loi” 
(“Prejudice: Before the law”) which focuses on the prejudice and pre-judgment which 
contaminates the concept of judgment. According to Gasché, Derrida notes that the question 
“How to judge?” has the potential to disorganize “the entire theoretico-ontological apparatus that 
prejudges that one must be able to judge what a judgment is before judging the manner in which 
one must judge, and so forth” (97). 1 Gasché ends his appendix by noting that a judgment is only 
truly a judgment for Derrida “when it also involves the heterogeneous event of a decision” (106).  
 To conclude, Gasché’s book is an erudite and insightful, yet accessible and clear, 
accompaniment to some of the key juridical themes in Derrida’s work. This work represents a 
valuable commentary, particularly for legal scholars, on Derrida’s intricate deconstructive 
thought and appears at a significant moment in the continuing reception of his work. 
                                                          
1 This is Gasche’s own translation taken from Jacques Derrida, ‘Préjuges: Devant la loi,’ in Jacques Derrida, 
Vincent Descombes, Garbis Kortian, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-François Lyotard, and Jean-Luc Nancy, 
eds., La Faculté de juger (Paris: Minuit, 1985), p. 93.  
  
